When No 1(F) Squadron took the Harrier GR3 to war in the Falklands conflict, it had many chalenges to overcome, but did so in the best RAF traditions. Using recently released official documents, this is the unit’s Operation ‘Corporate’ diary
The achievements of No 1(F) Squadron in ensuring its aircraft were suitably equipped for the task, working up, deploying and operating in both the air-to-ground and air-toair roles while in a very demanding theatre deserve due recognition. It was a commitment that not only contributed much to the success of British forces in recapturing the Falklands, but also to the continued development and success story of the RAF Harrier force.
The story of 1(F)’s war is a remarkable one, spearheaded by the efforts of its commanding officer, then-Wg Cdr Peter Squire. Later becoming Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter, he was Chief of the Air Staff from 2000 to 2003. His personal diaries provide candid insights into the ‘Corporate’ deployment; he also compiled the squadron’s operations record book during the conflict. Added to those, a number of files only released last year by the National Archives contain some fascinating material, including detailed accounts by other pilots and groundcrew.
Together, they help us recall this important chapter in RAF history. They also, now, form a tribute to Sir Peter Squire. This true gentleman sadly passed away on 19 February — he will be sorely missed.
2 April 1982: Squire recorded in his diary, “the crew room conversation is dominated by the news of the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands… The flexibility of the Harrier makes it an obvious choice for any retaliation but the deployment options look sparse indeed.”
8 April: A signal from the Ministry of Defence to the station commander of No 1(F) Squadron’s home base at RAF Wittering, Gp Capt Pat King, “asking for details of operational requirements to cater for possible involvement in the South Atlantic.”
13 April: Sqn Ldr Bob Iveson, a flight commander on 1(F), and the unit’s senior engineering officer Sqn Ldr Bruce Sobey visit Liverpool to inspect the laid-up Cunard container ship Atlantic Conveyor. They decide it could carry helicopters and Harriers to the South Atlantic, “operating the former during the voyage, but not the Harriers”. The vessel would be converted at Devonport with the addition of a VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) pad on the deck.
Eight aircraft, led by Squire, are flown to Goose Bay in Labrador as the first stage of a long-planned deployment to Cold Lake, Alberta for the ‘Maple Flag 9’ exercise. Writes Squire, “It is my first long ferry flight using AAR [air-to-air refuelling] and, as such, will prove to be a very useful dress rehearsal for what is to come”. The aircraft are flown on from Goose to Cold Lake by RAF Germany pilots.
15 April: The squadron starts ski-jump training at RNAS Yeovilton following validation of the GR3 for this purpose by A&AEE test pilots. Extra pilots with recent 1(F) experience are requested; further aircraft will be provided by No 233 Operational Conversion Unit and RAF Germany’s Harrier squadrons, Nos 3 and 4.
17 April: Answers to fundamental questions about the Harrier’s planned employment in the Falklands are still awaited. “At the same time”, writes Squire, “we continue to press for an AIM-9 [Sidewinder air-to-air missile] capability; even a cardboard mockup, if photographed and publicly displayed, could be to our advantage.”
19 April: A preliminary deployment plan is issued. Nine aircraft are to deploy to Ascension Island, six of them to go on to join the Task Force in the South Atlantic — as Squire later put it, they were “identified as replacements for Sea Harrier attrition and would operate from a CVS with minimum RAF manpower support” — and three to stay at Ascension for air defence. Sixteen GR3s will be modified for shipboard operations and given a Sidewinder fit. The AIM-9Gs themselves are provided from stocks at RAF Coningsby, then a Phantom base. Squadron engineers are put on 12-hour shifts around the clock.
21 April: Squire expresses concern in a signal “that short preparation time may preclude embodiment of all navalisation mods”. These include anti-corrosion treatment, shackles on the outrigger wheels, active nosewheel steering and an I-band transponder for recoveries in instrument flying conditions.
23 April: Exercise ‘Typhoon’ sees dissimilar air combat training (DACT) sorties against French Armée de l’Air Mirage IIIs and Aéronavale Super Étendards, organised at very short notice. These are two of the main Argentine combat jets likely to be encountered over the Falklands. Six 1-v-1 missions are flown against Mirages operating out of Coningsby, and one against Étendards flying direct from France. Sqn Ldr Jerry Pook, another of 1(F)’s flight commanders, reports, “Excellent training value”, both from the sorties themselves and post-mission debriefs on tactics and weapons system employment. Squire added of the Mirage, “Aircraft has excellent rate of turn at speeds in excess of 350kt. Below 350kt Mirage is still manoeuvrable but will normally lose to a Harrier in a slow-speed fight. Mirage tactics should therefore be to remain fast and make slashing attacks… GR3 tactics must be to remain low-level in order to minimise effectiveness of Mirage systems.”
The Defence Secretary was very open as to what we could expect and it was an interesting introduction
The MoD meanwhile signalled, “We have already examined the feasibility of fitting chaff or flares to Harrier and regret that in the very short term this is not possible… but rest assured that we will pursue its provision vigorously as capacity comes available”. It described the fitment as, “very much more complicated than AIM-9”.
26 April: Tests of the GR3’s radar warning receiver against HMS Birmingham’s Sea Dart radar.
27-28 April: The A&AEE conducts a Sidewinder test-firing campaign for the MoD’s Controller, Aircraft (CA) clearance. Time is getting very short.
28 April: The operation order for the nine-aircraft deployment to Ascension is issued.
30 April: Six AIM-9Gs are fired by No 1 Squadron pilots at the Aberporth range. This is part of an intensive operational work-up: ultra-low-level flying over the Otterburn range and over the sea when conditions were suitable, the dropping of BL755 cluster bomb units (CBUs) on a splash target, and rocketing at Holbeach with 2in Royal Navy projectiles, the GR3’s usual SNEB rockets not being cleared for embarkation. Squire recorded that it had been, “a most extraordinary month”. However, “What has been less satisfying is the seemingly disjointed command and control which has governed the planning and execution to date of the squadron’s involvement in Operation ‘Corporate’. Initially the squadron was reacting to inputs from four sources, MoD, Strike Command, 18 Group and the Navy, with 38 Group [to which 1(F) belonged] being kept very much in the dark. Only in the last week has any form of chain of command been established and even so there have been several instances of ‘left hand and right hand’; naturally such incidents have been most frustrating.”
1 May: On the day the first ‘Black Buck’ Vulcan raid heralds the start of RAF operations in the Falklands, 1(F)’s junior engineering officer Flt Lt Brian Mason and a ground support party of 17 leave Wittering for Ascension by Hercules.
2 May: The first five Harriers earmarked to deploy to Ascension are pre-positioned to St Mawgan. “That night”, Squire recorded, “the Defence Secretary, Mr John Nott made a specific point of visiting the Mess on his way through in order to meet the aircrew. He was very open as to what we could expect and it provided an interesting introduction to our new environment.”
3 May: Three aircraft depart St Mawgan in the morning, joining up with Victor tankers from Marham and setting off south. Two made Ascension in one leg of nine hours 15 minutes, without any support for the last 1,000 miles; the third diverted to Banjul in the Gambia as its tanker had insufficient fuel. The Harrier carried on to Ascension that night.
4 May: The next three aircraft leave St Mawgan. One, flown by Flt Lt John Rochfort, diverts into the island of Porto Santo near Madeira due to fuel transfer failure. Rochfort carries on by Hercules, but his aircraft is flown to Gibraltar and recovered to the UK. That evening, 1(F)’s pilots are the guests of 809 Naval Air Squadron — one of the Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier FRS1 units — at the Exiles Club in Georgetown, Ascension’s capital.
5 May: Another four aircraft begin their ferry flight. Again one diverts to Banjul with fuel transfer problems, in the hands of Flt Lt Ross Boyens. Aircraft and pilot reached Ascension on 6 May.
The Atlantic Conveyor also arrives at Ascension. Squire and Lt Cdr Tim Gedge, boss of 809 NAS, recce the ship’s facilities and plan the next day’s embarkation. Squire confides in his diary that Gedge, “really makes the briefing very long-winded.”
It is confirmed in an MoD signal that one AN/ALE-40 chaff and flare dispenser had been obtained. The intention is, “to carry out trial installation and flight trials ASAP with a view to equipping a total of 12 aircraft soonest”. One navalised GR3 was to be made available to the A&AEE for this purpose.
6 May: Embarkation of six GR3s on Atlantic Conveyor “carried out in slow time and without mishap”, wrote Squire, “although most pilots approached their first VL [vertical landing] onto a deck at sea with some apprehension. Conditions in the ship were very cramped as one would expect on a ship normally crewed by 31 but now manned with 150”. Also on board are eight Sea Harrier FRS1s to reinforce those Fleet Air Arm squadrons that have been active since the Task Force began operations. The other three Harriers are left behind at Ascension to provide air defence cover. A signal on this date states, “Air threat at Ascension is low and consists of covert operations by long range aircraft. Climate is mainly VMC [visual meteorological conditions]. Harrier GR3s adequate to cover such a threat in this climate. Use of Phantoms or Lightnings in the immediate future is ruled out due to excessive overload on Ascension facilities.”
7 May: That evening, Squire said, “after dark the amphibious armada led by HMS Fearless slipped anchor and set sail for the South Atlantic”. En route, the aircraft are bagged in specially designed Driclad covers and their FINRAE (Ferranti Inertial Rapid Alignment) systems, “designed to make it possible for alignments [of the inertial navigation system] to be carried out on a moving deck”, checked. In the event, a wiring problem in the aircraft and a software problem in the system meant it never quite fulfilled expectations, though it did give an accurate head-up heading and a stable platform for instrument flying, which was itself extremely welcome.
8 May: The Task Force commander requests deployment of six more GR3s. This is approved by the Secretary of State for Defence on 10 May.
13 May: No 1 Squadron’s 70th anniversary. Pre-dinner drinks take place in the Atlantic Conveyor’s wardroom and the ship’s master, Capt Ian North, is presented with the squadron flag. In return, 1(F) is given the Cunard flag.
17 May: The aircraft are unbagged and prepared for transfer to HMS Hermes. The AN/ALE-20 chaff and flare dispenser is given its release to service for the GR3.
18 May: The transfer of aircraft to Hermes starts, though serviceability and time pressures mean it is not completed until 19-20 May, all without incident.
19 May: A programme of air combat training, “to give pilots experience of deck operations and a chance to fly after the 12-day lay-off “. Squire and Flt Lt Jeff Glover are vectored 180nm north of the Task Force to intercept an Argentine Air Force Boeing 707. They are not successful, but it brings the unit into the war.
Squire wrote later, “The concept of a FOD-free deck is totally alien to normal Harrier procedures and it took some time for pilots to accept the cramped parking, the continual back-taxiing into position and the marshalling of aircraft nose to tail at very high power settings”. Although its centre of gravity was further back than the Sea Harrier’s, “Providing the correct ski-jump technique was used, take-offs from the 12° ramp posed no problem for the GR3”. Landings, he commented, “were not difficult”.
20 May: “The first successful war mission… a three-aircraft attack, led by the CO, against a POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants] storage area at Fox Bay”. Squire, Iveson and Pook dropped CBUs.
21 May: Britain’s invasion to recapture the Falklands begins and the Harriers are tasked in support of ground forces. “On one mission, led by Sqn Ldr Pook, a Chinook and a Puma helicopter were attacked and destroyed. During the multi-pass attack Flt Lt Hare’s aircraft received battle damage from ground fire”. HMS Hermes’ report of proceedings states, “Captain reprimands pilots for foolhardiness, but commends them for tenacity.”
“Later on in the morning”, 1(F)’s record goes on, “Flt Lt Glover [in GR3 XZ972] was sent on a CAS CAP [close air support combat air patrol] mission as a singleton after his leader [Squire] had gone unserviceable on take-off. During this sortie he was shot down, cause unknown, and his loss was a sad blow to us all. The day had reminded us of two important lessons, firstly not to linger longer than absolutely necessary in a defended area and secondly, not to launch singletons unless absolutely vital.” Initial release to service of the 1,000lb Paveway laser-guided bomb (LGB) comes through.
22 May: Armed recces are carried out. The news is “obtained through message intercept” that Glover had been captured.
24 May: The squadron’s first major attack on Stanley airfield — after toss-bombing by two Sea Harriers, two pairs of GR3s are to crater the runway with 1,000lb retard bombs. Two IA-58 Pucarás and a helicopter are destroyed, “but the runway damage, as expected, was only minimal and easily repaired.” Due to Victor shortages, a Harrier GR3 participates in an A&AEE trial with a Buccaneer tanker to gain CA release. However, this capability will not be used in the Falklands.
25 May: Argentina’s National Day, and a major attack on the Task Force by Exocet-armed Argentine Navy Super Étendards. Two missiles are fired, but seduced by chaff and re-locked on the Atlantic Conveyor. The vessel is hit and has to be abandoned; among the many lives lost is that of its captain.
“Fortunately all squadron personnel had been transferred to Hermes”, wrote Squire in the ORB. “The abandoned hull finally sank some three days later taking with it some 200 CBUs and the planking for the second strip ashore”. Also lost were a Pegasus engine, aircraft covers and possibly some other items of equipment that had gone missing during the transfer to Hermes.
Earlier, Harriers had tried toss deliveries for the first time, again against the Stanley runway. There were no direct hits; “the arrival of LGBs was awaited with keen anticipation”. Squire wrote in his official report, “It was recognised that Stanley itself was a well-defended target and most of the attacks against the runway were carried out using loft or high-level delivery techniques… The GR3 did not have the weapon aiming accuracy to stand better than a lucky chance of cutting the runway from high-level or loft profiles.”
In a signal, the MoD authorised the release of ARI-23353/1 electronic countermeasures (ECM) pods for service on the GR3, to be mounted in the starboard gun pod.
27 May: The Paras start their assault on Darwin and Goose Green. Harriers are tasked in support, but “many of the all-too-familiar problems of FAC [forward air control] were very evident. Aircraft had to hold at heights above 6,000ft in order to achieve communications and were often locked up by AAA [anti-aircraft artillery] radars whilst at the IPs [initial points]. Only one IP was used throughout the day and so any element of surprise was completely lost.”
In XZ988, Iveson was downed on the second sortie of the day to the same targets. “Again there was no FAC assistance and several targets were in the offing”, he wrote in an account held by the National Archives.
“I was told to go for a different gun, but I neither saw it [nor] received any detailed information about its precise location. But I went round for a second look and on that pass I detected company positions… I released my cluster bombs and it was, I think, a good attack.
“But, because I assumed the Paras were in trouble and needed every form of assistance they could get, I decided that I would give this attack everything I had, so I came in again, low and fast to use my 30mm guns. Normally this is tactically not advisable, but in view of the ground situation I felt it was a must.
“The gun attack worked well, giving the Argentine troops a long burst right along their trenches before pulling off. I had reversed my flight path down to 100ft when I felt hits, one closely followed by the other. They must have been fairly heavy calibre as the shock through the aircraft was very noticeable, there being two heavy thumps.
“Almost immediately the fire warning light came on, and I detected fumes in the cockpit. Suddenly the controls froze completely — I thought I must have been hit in both of the hydraulic control systems, But shortly after they cleared again although when I carried out a visual cockpit check, I found I was losing hydraulic pressure at an alarming rate.
“I punched the fire extinguisher system and checked in the mirror, looking along the top of the aircraft where I saw flames. Smoke then started pouring into the cockpit. Then the controls went slack and the aircraft went into a dive. I managed to arrest the angle by vectoring the engine nozzles (this provides a very powerful nose-up trim change which can be used to great effect in air combat) and the aircraft nose picked up. Although I had by then corrected the angle of dive, flames now started licking into the cockpit itself.
“The Pegasus engine was still fine, running in fine style — no problem at all. But it was obviously a situation that I could not sustain without any usable flying control, so I pulled the ejection handle. I must have passed out for a few seconds, because when I came to, I was flying horizontally through the air and going straight for a fireball — my burning aircraft.
“There were a few tense moments at that point, but fortunately the main chute opened and I was dropping clear of the fireball. I think I was on the chute only for about five or ten seconds — very quick indeed. As I landed I could not see very well, as my eyes were affected by the high-speed wind, blasting at my face during the ejection. “I did know, however, that I was on the wrong side of the lines — behind the Argentinean front-line forces…” Squire recounted in the ORB, “A keen sense of self-preservation secured his survival by living off the land and the comforts of a deserted farmhouse for the 48 hours before the Paras had secured the area and he was picked up by a 3 Cdo Bde [Commando Brigade] Gazelle.”
28 May: Further support is provided to Paras and other forces operating around Mount Kent, west of Stanley.
30 May: The first LGB attack on Stanley airfield. “The bombing aircraft dropped the weapon in a 60° dive from 35,000ft with a lateral displacement of 10,000ft from the desired point of impact. A second aircraft designated for the bomber again from 35,000ft… on this occasion the bomb did not fuse. Two further sorties were similarly unsuccessful and UK has now confirmed that the Harrier cannot designate for an LGB. Any further attacks will have to involve the use of an LTM [laser target marker].
“On the same day Sqn Ldr Pook [in XZ963] received small arms fire whilst en route to his target; the resultant fuel leak meant that he was forced to eject some 30 miles from the ship. He was rescued without problem and his recovery, together with the return of Sqn Ldr Iveson, was adequately celebrated that evening.”
31 May: Super Étendards are reported as possibly being at Stanley airfield; in a “panic reaction”, as described in the combat report, Harriers are sent to attack. The ORB says, “The task was given with no notice to the CO and Flt Lt Hare who were in the cockpit on RS5 [five-minute readiness], awaiting a CAS [close air support] task. Once again the attack was supported by Sea Harriers with VT [variable time] fused bombs”. The targets turned out to be a Beech T-34 and Aermacchi MB339s. This time, both Harriers “received battle damage with cracked windscreens, punctured fuel tanks and possible debris damage”. A lucky escape.
1 June: Two attrition replacement aircraft are flown from Ascension to join Hermes, an eight-and-a-half-hour trip, by No 3(F) Squadron’s Flt Lts Beech and MacLeod. These GR3s are fitted with chaff and flare dispensers and ECM pods.
4 June: Confirmation that Glover is in a military hospital in Argentina with a fractured shoulder and collarbone.
5 June: First landings at the San Carlos FOB (forward operating base) on East Falkland. It had a 280m temporary strip, forward observation point, two taxiing loops and a pillow tank for refuelling. Up to four aircraft could use it at any time. “The strip was far from ideal”, Squire wrote, “but it did permit both Sea Harriers and GR3s to respond more rapidly to demands for AD CAPs [air defence combat air patrols] and attack missions if required, especially since the Étendard/Exocet threat had forced the Task Force to move further east.”
8 June: XZ989, which was suffering from various known defects, crashes at the San Carlos strip in Squire’s hands while transitioning away from the hover. He wrote, “at about 90kt there is a marked drop in thrust which is not corrected by pushing through the limiter. As a result of the rate of descent and the fact that I am pointing directly at a Rapier [missile] FU [field unit], I elect not to eject and the aircraft hits the ground very hard”.
Two more aircraft arrive aboard Hermes from Ascension, flown by Flt Lts Ross Boyens and Nick Gilchrist.
The latter’s mount is modified to carry AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missiles; it was completed by 12 June but not used, as Squire described in his post-war report, because it was “decided that Argentinean radars should no longer be attacked”.
10 June: A new phase of operations: battlefield air interdiction-type sorties west of Stanley, often against targets dug in to hills and artillery positions.
12 June: “Flt Lt MacLeod’s aircraft [XW919] was hit in the rear equipment bay causing a fracture of the reaction control air piping. When approaching the hover, the escape of hot air caused a fire in the back of his aircraft. Despite this and alarming fuel indications in the cockpit, which indicated a massive fuel leak and possible flame-out, he carried out an immaculate vertical landing in the minimum possible time.”
Flt Sgt David Frost, part of the RAF engineering team aboard Hermes, wrote, “By the time the aircraft recovered on deck, the rear fuselage was cooking nicely and a lot of paint had been burnt off or was smouldering, in certain areas right down to the bare metal.”
13 June: The last attack mission of the war for 1(F), two bombs being delivered during each of two sorties flown by Squire and Pook against a dug-in position and field gun.
Both score direct hits. The squadron had flown 126 operational sorties in 25 days, excluding transits from ship to FOB and aborts due to unserviceability. It expended 83 CBUs, 52 2in RN rockets, 1,500 30mm cannon rounds, 31 1,000lb freefall bombs, 28 1,000lb retard bombs and 11 Paveway LGBs (only four actually with laser guidance).
“The whole episode”, Squire wrote, “has been a remarkable experience for all concerned with considerable courage being displayed in the air and true dedication shown by the small team of groundcrew, who worked long and hard in unfamiliar surroundings to produce serviceable aircraft.”
With the war over, the GR3s were re-roled to air defence with AIM-9s on their outboard pylons. Preparations were made for establishment of a full Harrier site — only Stanley airfield was deemed suitable, though still far from ideal, not least in terms of living conditions. Four more Harriers were brought from Ascension aboard MV Contender Bezant, arriving in Fitzwilliam Bay abeam Port Stanley harbour the day after the ceasefire.
On 4 July, the Harriers disembarked Hermes and landed at Stanley. The next morning, they started a quick reaction alert commitment, with two aircraft at 10-minute readiness. Sea Harriers came ashore to augment them. The additional GR3s were flown off Contender Bezant on 7 July. Elements of No 3(F) Squadron arrived to relieve their counterparts from 1(F) who had been deployed the longest.
There were occasional operational air defence scrambles responding to early warning reports, but no interceptions. It was always going to be a temporary commitment for the GR3s given the presence of the Sea Harriers, which were of course far better air defenders, and the forthcoming arrival of RAF Phantom FGR2s.
Personnel were rotated in and out for several months. Back home, Squire and Gilchrist flew in the victory flypast over London on 12 October; returning to the Falklands, Squire ejected from XW767 on 6 November after engine failure, being rescued within minutes from the water two miles north-west of RAF Stanley. Fittingly, he was the last 1(F) pilot to leave the Falklands, five days later. The Hardet (Harrier Detachment) task was handed over to No 4 Squadron.
Squire and Pook were both awarded the DFC for their efforts in the Falklands, while Iveson and Hare were mentioned in dispatches. These and the other honours bestowed on No 1(F) Squadron’s personnel were fitting recognition of their part in Operation ‘Corporate’ — an undertaking that cemented the Harrier’s reputation, and demonstrated the best qualities of the RAF.
